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THE END OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
EXCEPTION: PREVENTING THE
DETERRENCE OF FUTURE
LITIGANTS WITH RULE 82(b)(3)(I)
GORDON SOMMERS*
ABSTRACT
The public interest exception to Alaska’s loser-pays attorneys’ fees rule has
been overruled, but, under Rule 82(b)(3)(I), courts may still vary fee awards
on a case-by-case basis to avoid deterring future litigants. The result of this
transition is that the costs of litigation are highly unpredictable for
prospective plaintiffs. While the cases that developed the public interest
exception are no longer good law, their logic does offer some guidance for
judges wishing to protect court access. Even if courts tend to follow these
principles, however, plaintiffs will remain unable to adequately gauge the
costs of undertaking a lawsuit until new doctrine is developed that alleviates
the uncertainties of the current regime. For plaintiffs bringing particular
types of claims, Alaska’s courts may be an insuperably risky destination.
Even meritorious claims can become bad investments when the potential costs
too significantly outweigh the prospective benefits.

“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”1
So goes the most famous crack ever taken at our profession’s
expense. As Jack Cade, leader of a popular revolt against King Henry VI,
describes the utopia that awaits his followers, his clever henchman Dick
the Butcher coins one of Shakespeare’s most well-known lines: “let’s kill
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all the lawyers.”2 It is to be the first step towards a better world. The
devil, of course, is in the details, for Cade’s wonderland is a world
where his whim alone rules the land; where life, liberty, and property
know not the protections of the law.3 The freedoms we enjoy are only as
firm as the laws that protect them, and if a man cannot bring his claim
before a court, what claim does he have? We are lucky not to live in
Cade’s dystopian fantasy. When laws are violated, we can hire a lawyer.
The only question for us is who has to pay.

INTRODUCTION
In today’s world of increasingly expensive litigation, Alaska
remains unique in the United States for awarding partial attorneys’ fees
to prevailing parties in most civil cases.4 While other states use the socalled “American Rule,” where each party pays its own way
independently,5 Alaska uses a variant of the “English Rule.”6
Jurisdictions using the English Rule make the losing party responsible
for all or a part of the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees.7 In Alaska, the
default is either a scheduled percentage of the monetary damages
awarded,8 or 30% of the prevailing party’s “reasonable actual”
attorneys’ fees when no money judgment is recovered.9
2. Id.
3. Cade detests that the law should bind him:
Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb
should be made parchment; that parchment, being scribbled o'er,
should undo a man? Some say the bee stings, but I say, 'tis the bee's
wax; for I did but seal once to a thing, and I was never mine own man
since.
Id. at sc. 4.2, 71–76.
4. There are some exceptions that pepper the general rule. See, e.g., Dodson
v. Dodson, 955 P.2d 902, 914 (Alaska 1998) (stating special standard for
awarding attorneys’ fees in divorce cases).
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009). See also Arthur Allen Leff, The
Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2097 (1985) (“In the U.S. the
so-called ‘American rule’ is the norm; under it attorneys' fees are not ordinarily
paid by the losing party, though courts have power so to order when the loser is
deemed to have litigated frivolously or in bad faith, and under certain statutes,
e.g., some dealing with civil rights and conservation.”).
6. See Theodore Eisenberg, et al., When Courts Determine Fees in A System
with A Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1452, 1454 (2013) (“In the state of Alaska and in most Western
legal systems other than the United States, the prevailing norm is the English
rule, under which the losing party is required to pay the reasonable litigation
costs incurred by the winning party.”).
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (9th ed. 2009); Leff, supra note 5, at 2097.
8. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
9. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(2).
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Judges retain discretion to vary these awards,10 and considerable
case law has evolved to guide judges in this exercise. Alaskan citizens
have a right under both the Alaskan and Federal Constitutions to access
the courts as a forum for resolving their disputes,11 and so judges must
prevent attorneys’ fees awards from becoming so onerous that they
might deter similarly situated litigants from bringing claims in the
future.12 One of the most significant remedies created to address the
possibility of deterrence was the public interest exception, which
exempted qualifying plaintiffs from paying their opponents’ attorneys’
fees if they lost, but awarded the plaintiffs full (rather than partial)
attorneys’ fees from the other side if they won.13 The public interest
exception applied whenever a litigant’s case: (1) effectuated strong
public policies, (2) would benefit numerous people, (3) could only have
been brought by a private party, and (4) would not have been otherwise
motivated by sufficiently strong economic incentives.14 For better or
worse, this exception was abolished in 2003 by the Alaska state
legislature.15
The public interest exception was overturned by an act informally
referred to as “HB 145.”16 After its passage, this law was challenged in
State v. Native Village of Nunapitchuk.17 Although the supreme court
ultimately upheld HB 145,18 it was only able to save it from
unconstitutionality by finding that it in no way modified Rule
82(b)(3)(I), which expressly grants trial courts the authority to vary an
attorneys’ fees award based on “the extent to which [the] given fee
award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter
similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the courts.”19 In
other words, after HB 145, trial courts remain free to consider all
relevant factors, including all of those identified in the public interest
10. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
11. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (finding a right of
access to civil courts under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution); State v. Native Vill. of
Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 405 (Alaska 2007) (“Our cases have recognized that
the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution guarantees the right of access
to Alaska's courts.”)
12. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406 (holding that courts can still shield litigants
from attorneys’ fees awards in order to prevent deterrence despite legislative
action appearing to limit this ability).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 394.
15. HB 145, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86 (codified as amended at ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.60.10, 09.68.040 (2014)).
16. Id.
17. 156 P.3d 389.
18. Id. at 406.
19. Id. at 404 n.68.
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exception, when deciding whether or not to reduce attorneys’ fees
awards to avoid unconstitutional future deterrence.20 Nonetheless,
which factors to use, and their respective weights, is no longer clear. The
structure and attendant predictability of the public interest exception are
gone; instead, courts may apply Rule 82(b)(3)(I) “on a case-by-case
basis,” considering whichever factors they deem relevant and weighing
those factors however they find appropriate.21
This renders the costs of litigation highly unpredictable for
prospective plaintiffs. While the logic of the cases that developed the
public interest exception is still sound, the cases themselves are no
longer good law after HB 145. One can distill some guiding principles
from a close study of the case law, but, until new doctrine is developed,
plaintiffs will remain unable to adequately gauge the costs of
undertaking a lawsuit. For plaintiffs bringing certain types of claims,
this may make Alaska’s courts an insuperably risky destination; even
meritorious claims can become bad investments when the potential costs
are too high.
Alaska has struggled over the years to find a balance between its
English Rule and the constitutional rights of litigants to access its
courts.22 After the passage of HB 145 and the Nunapitchuk decision, it is
clear that this endeavor has not yet reached its end.

I. BACKGROUND
Use of the English Rule in Alaska arrived with the adoption of
Oregon law in the mid-1800s and never left.23 After Alaska achieved
statehood, the English Rule became codified in Alaska’s Rule 82 of Civil
Procedure and was adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1960.24
Thereafter, as Alaska’s court system matured, the supreme court
undertook the gradual process of carefully delineating the outer edges
of trial courts’ discretion in assessing awards of attorneys’ fees under
Rule 82. Awards so onerous that they could deter similarly situated
litigants were emphatically marked as an abuse of discretion.25 It was

20. Id. at 406.
21. Id.
22. See discussion in Part II, infra.
23. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska's English Rule: Attorney's
Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 38 (1996).
24. See Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 17 (1960) (activating Alaska’s state court
system); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
25. See, e.g., Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973)
(finding it “manifestly unreasonable” and an abuse of discretion to
automatically award full attorneys’ fees against a losing party).
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from this line of cases that the public interest exception emerged.26
Rule 82, Alaska’s fee shifting rule, provides partial recompense for
the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees to effect a more complete
recovery.27 It was never intended to punish losing parties.28
Commentators have held out Alaska’s English Rule as a tort reform
solution, but this was never its stated purpose, nor has empirical
evidence suggested that it is actually achieving this goal.29 Nonetheless,
policy-makers and commentators persist in discussing the prevention of
frivolous claims as a de facto rationale for using the English Rule in
Alaska.30
A.

The Public Interest Exception

While the English Rule seems no closer to ending its reign in
Alaska now than it did in the 19th century, there has been considerable
discussion over the years about its capacity to deter litigants.31 Plainly,

26. See HB 145, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86 § 1(b) (listing major cases in
the development of the public interest exception for the purpose of overruling
them); Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 394 (citing Malvo as the first major case in the
development of the public interest exception). See also, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 526
P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974) (citing deterrence as rationale); Anchorage v.
McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 990 (Alaska 1977) (citing deterrence as rationale); Kenai
Lumber Co., Inc. v. State, 646 P.2d 215, 222 (Alaska 1982) (citing deterrence as
rationale).
27. See Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 398 (“Without the rule, the rights of the
prevailing party would be less completely vindicated because of the
uncompensated expense of litigation.”).
28. See Malvo, 512 P.2d at 587 (“The purpose of Civil Rule 82 is to partially
compensate a prevailing party for the costs and fees incurred where such
compensation is justified and not to penalize a party for litigating a good faith
claim.”).
29. See Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the
Impact of Alaska's English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 2–
3 (2012) (noting that “some academic and media commentators have [recently]
suggested that other states use Alaska's Rule 82 as a model for tort reform”); id.
at 43 (“Data from the federal courts show that civil and tort filings in the District
of Alaska, while below the national average, resembled those in a sample of
similar districts.”).
30. See, e.g., HB 145–Attorney Fees: Public Interest Litigants, Committee
Minutes, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM., 23rd Leg. (May 7, 2003)
(statement of Benjamin Brown, Legislative Assistant, Alaska State Chamber of
Commerce at 1:40 PM) (“The [Alaska State Chamber of Commerce] supports
Rule 82 [attorneys’] fees because this modification of the English rule puts
an incentive into the litigation process that makes people not file frivolous suits
and realize that there may be a downside to their causing others to spend money
to defend a suit that is not likely to be prevailed upon.”), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HJUD2003-05-071340.PDF.
31. See Kevin Michael Kordziel, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in
Alaska, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 444–45 (1993) (“[T]he most significant divergence
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anything that can potentially increase the cost of a lawsuit runs the risk
of dissuading prospective litigants. One tool that developed to address
this concern was the public interest exception.
Prior to the legislature’s passage of HB 145 in 2003, the public
interest exception granted special status to plaintiffs bringing claims that
exhibited the following four attributes: (1) “the effectuation of strong
public policies”; (2) “the fact that numerous people received benefits
from plaintiffs’ litigation success;” (3) “the fact that only a private party
could have been expected to bring this action,” and (4) “whether a
litigant claiming public interest litigant status would have a sufficient
economic incentive to bring the lawsuit even if it involved only narrow
issues lacking general importance.”32 The defensive element of the
exception held that no attorneys’ fees could be assessed against such a
plaintiff, if she lost. The affirmative component provided that, if such a
litigant prevailed, she was “generally entitled to full, reasonable
attorney’s fees.”33 Even winning on “some but not all issues” would
entitle a plaintiff to full fees, so long as Alaska law indicated she was the
prevailing party in the suit.34
This exception developed from a line of cases preoccupied with
court access for plaintiffs deemed especially vulnerable to deterrence.35

of opinion between plaintiffs' and defense lawyers [in a survey of the Alaska
Bar] occurred over the questions that specifically focused on [court access].”). See
also, e.g., Bozarth v. Atl. Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 4 n.3 (Alaska 1992) (“It may
be . . . that costs of litigation have increased to such an extent that the prospect of
having to pay Rule 82 fees deters a broad spectrum of our populace from the
voluntary use of our court.”). There has also been significant scholarly
discussion over the years regarding deterrent effects of the English Rule as a
general fee shifting paradigm outside of Alaska. See Jonothan T. Molot, Fee
Shifting and the Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1811 (2013) (“[W]here a
plaintiff is risk averse or resource constrained, it may simply be unable to bear
the risk of losing a case and being stuck with the defendant’s legal fees. In a
system characterized by imbalances in resources and risk preferences, fee
shifting may unduly inhibit already risk-averse plaintiffs—and aggravate, rather
than assuage, existing problems. Instead of incentivizing plaintiffs to file
meritorious claims, as it is intended to do, fee shifting may discourage them
from filing for fear of making a mistake and being saddled with a large
liability.”).
32. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 394.
33. Id. at 395.
34. Id. See Dansereau v. Ulmer, 955 P.2d 916, 920 (Alaska 1998) (holding that
awards of attorneys’ fees to public interest litigants should not usually be
partitioned once the party has been determined to have prevailed).
35. Cf. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 394 (recounting history of public interest
exception); HB 145, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86 § 1(b) (codified as amended at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.60.10, 09.68.040 (2014)) (listing the main cases it was
intended to overrule in abolishing the public interest exception). See also
discussion infra Parts I.B–C.
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These cases subdivide, usefully, into two strands.36 The first deals with
the protective component of the exception: immunizing losing plaintiffs
from having to pay for the defendants’ attorneys’ fees. These cases were
primarily concerned with making sure that the cost of accessing the
courts was not too high. The second strand added the affirmative
component: entitling prevailing public interest plaintiffs to full
reasonable attorneys’ fees. These cases dealt less with the potentially
chilling cost that could arise from having to pay a defendant’s attorneys’
fees, and focused instead on who would have to pay for the plaintiff’s
attorney. While both sets of cases had the underlying goal of ensuring
that plaintiffs could bring their claims before Alaska’s courts, they each
approached a different half of the problem.
B.

The Protective Strand: Court Access

The public interest exception was born from a series of cases
beginning in 1973.37 When it was first created, the public interest
exception was only protective in nature, concerned primarily with
ensuring that Alaska’s English Rule did not infringe upon court access.
In Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co.,38 the Alaska Supreme Court held that it was
manifestly unreasonable to award full attorneys’ fees to a prevailing
party automatically, unless the losing claim or defense had been brought
in bad faith.39 The court reasoned that “where in order to seek judicial
remedies, a plaintiff must risk liability for the full amount of attorney’s
fees the other side sees fit to incur, it takes little imagination to foresee
that the size of a party’s bank account will have a major impact on his
access to the courts.”40 Although the court made a point of not actually
reaching the constitutional issue in this case,41 it expressly noted that

36. Cf. Krone v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 222 P.3d 250, 253
(Alaska 2009) (discussing differences between two components of the public
interest exception); Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 403–04 (detailing differences
between two components of the public interest exception).
37. See Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 394–95 (recounting history of public interest
exception); HB 145, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86 § 1(b) (listing the main cases
HB 145 was intended to overrule in abolishing the public interest exception).
38. 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973).
39. See id. at 587 (“If a successful litigant were to receive full reimbursement
for all expenses incurred in the case with no requirement of justification and no
consideration of the ‘good faith’ nature of the unsuccessful party's claim or
defense, there would be a serious detriment to the judicial system.”).
40. Id.
41. See id. (“We do not have to reach the constitutional issue since it is
‘manifestly unreasonable’ to establish a policy under Civil Rule 82 that would
enable a store owner to receive such a sizeable allowance for attorney's fees
against a party who has brought suit in good faith.”).
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such a cost requirement could jeopardize a party’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.42
A year later, in Gilbert v. State,43 the court extended Malvo and
formally established the protective component of the public interest
exception, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to award any
attorneys’ fees at all “against a losing party who [had] in good faith
raised a question of genuine public interest before the courts.”44 The
plaintiff, Gilbert, sought a declaratory judgment regarding the State’s
residency requirement for those who wished to hold public office.45
After Gilbert lost the case, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees against
him, and Gilbert appealed.46 Overturning the fees award, the supreme
court built upon Malvo’s proposition that Rule 82 was not intended to
penalize losing litigants.47 The court noted that it had considered
adopting a public interest exception to protect losing litigants twice
before, but that the facts presented in each of the earlier cases had
weighed against doing so at the time.48
The cases referenced by the Gilbert court were Jefferson v. City of
Anchorage49 and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Commission.50 In
Jefferson, the court remarked that an award of $2,000 might have been
excessive in light of the public interest nature of the suit, but for the fact
that the plaintiff’s case “so clearly lacked merit” as to nullify any claim
that the public interest was being vindicated.51 In Mobil Oil Corp., a
group of corporations sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
lawfulness of a state agency’s decision.52 After they lost, the plaintiffs
appealed the award of attorneys’ fees against them and argued that the
fear of incurring an adverse fee award would deter citizens from
litigating questions of general interest to the community.53 However, as
in Jefferson, the court refrained from exploring the idea of a public
42. Id. See also Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 394 (“In Malvo . . . [t]he court noted
that such a cost requirement could offend due process by limiting access to the
court.”); Bozarth v. Atl. Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5 (Alaska 1992) (Matthews,
J., dissenting) (explaining the supreme court had previously “recognized the
right of access to the courts in the specific context of court awarded attorney's
fees” in its Malvo opinion).
43. 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974).
44. Id. at 1136.
45. Id. at 1131–32.
46. Id. at 1136.
47. Id.
48. Id. (“We have previously intimated that denial of attorneys’ fees might
be appropriate where the public interest is involved.”).
49. 513 P.2d 1099.
50. 518 P.2d 92.
51. Jefferson, 513 P.2d at 1102.
52. Mobil Oil Corp., 518 P.2d at 96.
53. Id. at 104.
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interest exception, because the financial stakes in the Mobil Oil Corp.
controversy were “large enough to prompt a suit without consideration
of the public interest” at all.54
As in these cases, the plaintiffs in Gilbert argued “that awarding
fees in this type of controversy [would] deter citizens from litigating
questions of general public concern for fear of incurring the expense of
the other party’s attorneys’ fees.”55 Unlike in the prior cases, however,
the court saw no fault with the facts presented in Gilbert and held that
attorneys’ fees should not be awarded against litigants who, in good
faith, bring claims of public interest before the court.56
The court’s hesitance to reach a similar result in Mobil Oil Corp.
where there were powerful financial incentives to bring the suit
regardless of the public interest, emphasizes that the potential for
deterrence was the primary rationale underlying these holdings, rather
than some policy of affirmatively encouraging suits in the public
interest. In Mobil Oil Corp., unlike in Gilbert, the court was satisfied that
the benefits of litigation for those similarly situated to the plaintiff
corporations would sufficiently outweigh the potential costs.57 Similarly,
once the supreme court began to unify its public interest exception
holdings under a single, multi-factor test,58 it was quick to include a
factor that queried “whether the litigant claiming public interest status
would have had sufficient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit even
if it involved only narrow issues lacking general importance.”59 Had the
court simply wanted to promote suits that it deemed beneficial, such a
limitation on the exception would have been unnecessary.
C.

The Affirmative Strand: Incentives

The court’s 1977 opinion in Anchorage v. McCabe60 marked the
addition of the public interest exception’s affirmative component:
automatic full fee shifting to prevailing plaintiffs.61 Where, previously,
54. Id. The sums of money referred to were not monetary damages from the
case itself, but rather investments whose value would have been affected by the
outcome of the declaratory judgment sought. Id. at 96.
55. Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974).
56. Id.
57. Mobil Oil Corp., 518 P.2d at 104.
58. See Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 991 (Alaska 1977) (establishing
a three-factor test for identifying public interest litigants to whom the exception
would apply).
59. Kenai Lumber Corp. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215, 223 (Alaska 1982).
60. 568 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1977).
61. Id. at 993–94 (“[T]he successful public interest plaintiff, acting as a
‘private attorney general,’ should not be penalized by Rule 82 by failing to
receive full compensation for the costs of litigating issues of public
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prevailing plaintiffs only received partial attorneys’ fees as the default,
the default after McCabe was to award prevailing public interest litigants
the full amount they had spent on the litigation, provided, of course, that
the expense was reasonable.62 Because public interest litigants were
already protected from attorneys’ fees awards against them, the public
interest exception now looked just like the full unilateral fee shifting
system used in various federal statutes.63 The court premised the award
of full fees under the public interest exception on the same rationale that
supported full unilateral fee shifting in federal civil rights cases:
When a plaintiff brings an action under (Title II), he cannot
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general’,
vindicating a policy that congress considered of the highest
priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear
their own attorney’s fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a
position to advance the public interest by invoking the
injunctive powers of the federal courts.64
Although the court claimed that this served as the basis for its
Gilbert decision, no such language appears anywhere in the history of
the public interest exception prior to McCabe.65 McCabe was the case that
first adopted this rationale in support of a new, affirmative component
to the public interest exception.
The McCabe opinion also contained the court’s first formalized test
for identifying public interest cases.66 An action by private citizens could
be considered “public interest litigation because of the presence of three
factors: ‘(1) the effectuation of strong public policies; (2) the fact that
numerous people received benefits from plaintiffs’ litigation success; (3)
importance.”).
62. Id.
63. In all other Alaska cases, Rule 82 continued to provide that the default
was partial, bi-directional fee shifting. See id. at 989 (“[C]osts and attorney’s fees
are normally awarded to the prevailing party.”).
64. Id. at 990 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))
(“The basis for [the Piggie Park] holding was the same policy articulated by this
court in Gilbert to encourage plaintiffs to raise issues of public interest by
removing the awesome financial burden of such a suit.”).
65. The only use of the “private attorney general” phrase in a published
opinion prior to McCabe was in Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700
(Alaska 1975), where plaintiffs contended that the trial court’s award of
attorneys’ fees against them should have been reduced “in consideration that
they were acting as private attorney generals [sic] in initiating” the action. Id. at
717. Citing Mobil Oil Corp., the supreme court rejected this argument because
there was sufficient financial incentive for the Lynden Transport plaintiffs to bring
the case without any regard for the public interest. Id.
66. McCabe, 568 P.2d at 991.
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the fact that only a private party could have been expected to bring this
action.’”67 The court borrowed this test from federal fee shifting case
law.68
In Dansereau v. Ulmer,69 the supreme court extended McCabe’s fee
shifting policy by holding that, absent exceptional circumstances, trial
courts could not partition fee awards to public interest litigants that
were considered prevailing parties under Alaska law. Generally, as long
as the litigant prevailed on at least one of the issues they raised, they
were entitled to their full fees.70 The court decided that the test to
determine a prevailing party under Rule 82 was sufficiently
comprehensive. This finalized the modern form of the public interest
exception’s affirmative component.
As noted before, McCabe’s holding that public interest plaintiffs
were entitled to full attorneys’ fees made the public interest exception
comparable to the unilateral fee shifting statutes that American Rule
jurisdictions sometimes used.71 Plaintiffs in all jurisdictions typically pay
their attorneys through a contingency fee agreement: if they lose, they
pay the attorney nothing, and if they win, the attorney gets a percentage
of the damages awarded. Most unilateral fee shifting statutes operate in
contexts where contingency fees are inappropriate because the lawsuits
are for little or no economic damages.72 For example, if not for the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976,73 a civil rights plaintiff
seeking an injunction would have to pay her legal fees up front and outof-pocket to vindicate her legal rights—there are no monetary damages

67. Id. (quoting La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
aff’d, 488 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974)).
68. See La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 101 (applying the same test to determine
applicability of the now defunct common law private attorney general doctrine).
69. 955 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1998).
70. Id. at 920.
71. See generally HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDS OF
ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf (listing and describing all
federal fee shifting statutes and doctrines).
72. See id. for examples of federal fee shifting statutes and doctrines. See also
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“If successful
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved
parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the
injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision
for counsel fees . . . to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to
seek judicial relief . . . .”); La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 98 (holding that the plaintiff
should have been awarded attorneys’ fees under the federal private attorney
general doctrine where, in addition to other necessary factors, “the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award
essential”).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).
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to split with the attorney in such a case. While there is no constitutional
guarantee to counsel in civil litigation, it may make sense, as a policy
matter, to ensure that these cases can be effectively brought before the
courts.
This was the motivation for McCabe’s unilateral fee shifting rule as
well; the McCabe court sought to ensure that important lawsuits could be
reasonably brought before the courts, regardless of the size of a
plaintiff’s bank account.74 One of the requirements of the public interest
exception was always that the incentives for the suit needed to be
primarily non-economic.75
When full unilateral fee shifting applies to a case for non-monetary
damages, the plaintiff is put in much the same position as a normal
plaintiff under the American Rule, bearing no liability for a loss and
paying her attorney out of proceeds from the case, should she prevail.
The victim of such a policy decision is the defendant, upon whom the
burden of these fees will fall. This seems unfair to the extent that the
defendant’s legal position was reasonably justified in a particular case.
At the same time, without some transfer of attorneys’ fees, plaintiffs
could end up footing significant costs to enforce their rights when
seeking non-economic relief.76 To the extent that a defendant’s legal
position was not reasonably justified, this would be incredibly unfair to
plaintiffs. The real problem is that litigation is very expensive, creating
an inevitable tension between guaranteeing court-access for plaintiffs,
which may require that someone else pay their costs, and fairness to
defendants, who may be left bearing an undeserved burden if all the
costs fall to them. When either side’s claim is clearly unreasonable, the
solution is easy: make that party pay. But where real uncertainty exists
in the applicable law, this conflict may become irreconcilable.
This conflict is what ultimately distinguished the affirmative
component of the public interest exception from the protective
component. Affirmative fee shifting creates a positive right of access to
74. Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 990 (Alaska 1977) (“When a
plaintiff brings an action under [the federal statute], he cannot recover damages.
If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private
attorney general’” (quoting Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. at 402)). See also COHEN,
supra note 71, at 5–6 (explaining the rise and fall of the common law private
attorney general doctrine in federal courts).
75. E.g., State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 394 (Alaska 2007)
(describing the “sufficient economic incentive” inquiry in determining whether
an action is public interest litigation). Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary
Comm’n, 518 P.2d 92 (Alaska 1974) (refusing to create public interest exception
because sufficient alternative economic incentives existed to bring the case at
bar).
76. See generally COHEN, supra note 71 (comprehensively describing federal
fee shifting statutes).
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the courts, not merely a negative right.77 A negative right implies that
the government cannot do something to you—impose a cost, take
something away, etc.—while a positive right requires the government to
give you something, to allocate a resource in a certain way.78 When a
resource is limited, conferral of a positive right becomes a policy
decision to favor one possible allocation over others.79 By way of
comparison, consider the constitutional right of free speech: while the
government cannot interfere with the use of a printing press, it has no
obligation to provide an individual with a press in the first place,
indicating there is a negative, but not a positive, right.
When the affirmative component of the public interest exception
required others to pay for a prevailing plaintiff’s right of access to the
courts, it created a positive right to the courts, comparable to a criminal
defendant’s right to counsel.80 This is what Alaska’s general fee shifting
rule does to a lesser extent, and without favoring either plaintiffs or
defendants. In either case, though, someone has to pay for the right. This
sharply contrasts with the negative right guarded by the protective
component of the public interest exception: that the government shall
not deny a citizen’s access to the courts.81
McCabe’s holding that prevailing public interest litigants should be
entitled to full attorneys’ fees created a positive right where one had not
previously existed.82 Unlike the protective component of the public
interest exception, this was fundamentally a policy decision, allocating
the costs of litigation in a certain way and imposing a burden on some
parties in order to ensure a right for others.83

77. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978) (discussing the
differences between positive and negative rights).
78. Id.
79. Cf. id. (“Positive rights are inevitably asserted to scarce goods, and
consequently scarcity implies a limit to the claim.”).
80. See id. (referring to the “attentions of a lawyer” as a positive right). For
background on the positive right to counsel in criminal cases, see also Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (requiring states to provide counsel to
criminal defendants who are unable to afford their own).
81. For more information on the court access rights conferred by the federal
and Alaska constitutions, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971)
(finding a right of access to civil courts under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution); Bush v. Reid, 516
P.2d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 1973) (finding a right of access to the civil courts under
ALASKA CONST. Art. I § 7).
82. Cf. Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 995 (Alaska 1977) (Boochever,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the court’s proper role in this context was to
prevent the courts from becoming inaccessible, not to encourage particular
forms of litigation).
83. See id. at 991 (declaring the first factor in the public interest exception
test to be “the effectuation of strong public policies” (quoting La Raza Unida v.
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II. HB 145 AND STATE V. NATIVE VILLAGE OF
NUNAPITCHUK
After mounting pressure from unhappy defendants, the legislature
finally abolished the public interest exception in 2003 with an act
referred to in Alaska as HB 145.84 The stated intent of the act was “to
expressly overrule the decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court in
Dansereau v. Ulmer; . . . Anchorage v. McCabe; Gilbert v. State, and their
progeny, insofar as they relate to the award of attorney fees and costs to
or against public interest litigants in future civil actions and appeals.”85
The main implementing provision of the act stated as follows:
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a court in this state
may not discriminate in the award of attorney fees and costs to
or against a party in a civil action or appeal based on the nature
of the policy or interest advocated by the party, the number of
persons affected by the outcome of the case, whether a
governmental entity could be expected to bring or participate
in the case, the extent of the party’s economic incentive to bring

Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972)); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 268–69 (1975) (striking down the common law
private attorney general doctrine defined in La Raza Unida—which extended the
doctrine to statutes that had no explicit fee shifting provision—and holding that
the implementation of such measures is a policy matter that Congress has
reserved for itself).
84. HB 145, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86 (codified as amended at ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.60.10, 09.68.040 (2014)). Although much of the debate over HB 145
centered on the costs of litigation against the state over natural resources issues,
the underlying facts were highly disputed. See, e.g, HB 145–Atty Fees: Public
Interest Litigants, ALASKA H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM. MINUTES, 23rd Leg. (May
7, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HJUD2003-05071340.PDF. For one, a research report authored by the Legislative Legal and
Research Services found that, of the nineteen natural resources cases that had
used the public interest exception in the ten years between 1993 and 2003, the
plaintiffs had prevailed in seventeen and not one of the cases was found to be
frivolous. Id. at 65 (statement of Rep. Les Gara).
85. HB 145 § 1(b) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). HB 145 also
mentioned two other cases by name: Southeastern Alaska Conservation Council, Inc.
v. State, 665 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1983), and Thomas v. Bailey, 611 P.2d 536 (Alaska
1980). Bailey confirmed that McCabe’s three-factor test for public interest
litigation applied at the appellate level as well as in trial courts. 611 P.2d at 539.
Bailey also offered some insight into factors a court might consider when
calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees to award, and resolved that fees were to be
based on the actual work done by the attorneys, charged at a reasonable rate,
and not based on a speculative valuation of the public benefit created by the
litigation. Id. at 540–43. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc. rejected the
existence of any distinction between public and private defendants for purposes
of the public interest exception. 665 P.2d at 553.
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the case, or any combination of these factors.86
The act also prohibited decisions regarding interlocutory relief
from bonds and other security measures from being based on any of
these factors.87 The Act distinguished constitutional claims and codified
an exception for them that largely mirrors the former public interest
exception, though narrower in scope.
A.

State v. Native Village of Nunapitchuk

After its passage, HB 145 was challenged by a number of plaintiffs
concerned that it would limit their ability to ensure proper application
of the laws.88 In State v. Native Village of Nunapitchuk,89 the village and
other plaintiff groups sought a declaratory judgment that HB 145 was
invalid for both procedural and constitutional reasons.90 First, the
plaintiffs argued that if the act changed a procedural rule promulgated
by the supreme court under article IV, section 15 of the Alaska
Constitution, then it would have needed a two-thirds supermajority in
both houses to be amended by the legislature.91 Second, the plaintiffs
argued that HB 145 unconstitutionally infringed upon the plaintiffs’
access to courts.92
The Nunapitchuk court upheld HB 145,93 but did so with the
sizeable caveat that “litigants advancing public interest claims may still,
on a case-by-case basis, be shielded from awards of attorney’s fees
under Rule 82(b)(3)(I) for much the same reason that [the court]
accepted when [it] first adopted the exception in its original protective
form: awarding fees in public interest cases may ‘deter citizens from
litigating questions of general public concern.’”94 Comparing the public
interest exception to “fee shifting provisions intertwined with
substantive statutes that call for attorney’s fee awards in particular
cases,” the court found that the public interest exception was substantive
in nature and could therefore be overruled by the legislature, just like a
statute.95 At the same time, to save it from being unconstitutional, the
court read the Act narrowly to prevent it from infringing on citizens’

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

HB 145 § 2(b).
Id. § 3(c) at 2.
Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 393.
156 P.3d 389, 394 (Alaska 2007).
Id.
Id. at 393; ALASKA CONST. art. IV § 15.
Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 393.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406 (quoting Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974)).
Id. at 403–04.
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right of access to the courts.96
The result of the opinion is that the public interest exception is
dead, but Rule 82(b)(3)(I) may be used to reduce attorneys’ fee awards in
its place when the fees would “be so onerous to the non-prevailing party
that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of
the courts.”97 Courts may consider any of the factors used by the public
interest exception in making this determination,98 but because trial
courts are no longer limited by the clear structure of the exception,
courts may also consider other factors they deem relevant,99 and are free
to reduce an award by whatever extent they determine will cure its
potential deterrent effect.100 This creates considerable uncertainty for
plaintiffs, because both their eligibility for a fee reduction and the
amount of that reduction are now very unclear. A closer study of the
Nunapitchuk opinion, in light of the cases that preceded it, helps to
clarify the current doctrine to some extent, but further developments in
the law are needed to help Alaska find a truly optimal balance between
the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and the affirmative fee shifting
policy enshrined in Rule 82.
B.

The Nunapitchuk Court’s Analysis

In Nunapitchuk, the court first had to decide whether HB 145 had
modified a rule governing practice and procedure in the Alaska court
system. If so, the Alaska Constitution would have required that the Act
be passed with a two-thirds supermajority in both houses.101 The first
step in this inquiry was to take a closer look at Rule 82 itself. Although
the court struggled to clearly delineate the substance-procedure
dichotomy, the court relied heavily on the test described in Nolan v. Sea
Airmotive, Inc.102 in its determination regarding Rule 82.103 Nolan

96. Id. at 404–06. The court determined that construing the act so as to not
substantially affect Rule 82 was “supported by the rule of construction that
statutes should be construed, if possible, to avoid the risk of
unconstitutionality.” Id. at 405.
97. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3)(I).
98. See Nunaptichuk, 156 P.3d at 406 (“Litigants advancing public interest
claims may still, on a case-by-case basis, be shielded from awards of attorneys’
fees under Rule 82(b)(3)(I).”).
99. See id. (allowing courts to consider “all relevant factors”).
100. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
101. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV § 15 (granting authority to supreme court to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure, and specifying that these rules may
only be changed by the legislature with a “two-thirds vote of the members
elected to each house”); Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 393 (summarizing arguments of
plaintiffs).
102. 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).
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emphasized that an important part of the inquiry into whether a rule is
substantive or procedural should be “an examination of whether the
rule or statute under scrutiny is more closely related to the concerns that
led to the establishment of judicial rule making power, or to matters of
public policy properly within the sphere of elected representatives.”104
Examining the history and purposes of Rule 82, the Nunapitchuk court
determined that it was indeed a procedural rule.105
The court also had to determine whether the public interest
exception itself was a substantive or procedural doctrine. The court
began its analysis of the public interest exception by comparing it with
Rule 82, which it described as a policy neutral, two-way fee shifting
regime, designed to partially recompense prevailing parties for their
legal fees.106 The court contrasted this system with the many state and
federal substantive statutes that incorporate one-way fee shifting
provisions as a means of furthering their public policy goals.107 Like
these statutes, and unlike Rule 82, the public interest exception only
shifted fees to prevailing plaintiffs, and awarded those plaintiffs actual,
reasonable attorneys’ fees.108 Describing the public interest exception as
“intended to encourage litigation that [would] further public policies,”
the court found the exception fit within Nolan’s characterization of a
substantive rule, “closely related to . . . matters of public policy properly
within the sphere of elected representatives.”109 Accordingly, the court
held that the legislature had the authority to overrule it with a statute.110
Second, the court resolved the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim by
finding that, properly construed, HB 145 was not facially invalid
because it did not preclude courts from exercising their discretion to
prevent awards that could unconstitutionally deter similarly situated
future plaintiffs.111 Noting that courts should strive to construe statutes

103. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 396.
104. Nolan, 627 P.2d at 1042–43.
105. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 395–402. Because the rule was procedural, the
court also had to determine whether HB 145 modified it. As discussed infra, the
court ultimately construed the statute so that it did not modify Rule 82, in order
to avoid the constitutional issues that would have arisen; this avoided the
potential procedural problem here as well.
106. Id. at 403. The court went as far as to note that “[t]he two-way and
policy-neutral features of Rule 82 contribute in an important way to the rule’s
procedural character.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 403–04 (quoting Nolan, 627 P.2d at 1042–43) (alterations in
Nunapitchuk).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 405–06 (“As so construed, it is not possible to conclude that [HB
145] is facially invalid on denial of access to the courts grounds.”).
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to avoid the risk of unconstitutionality, the court determined that Rule
82 itself was not in any way modified by HB 145, except to bar
consideration of the public policy nature of the litigation when varying
awards under subsection (b)(3)(K)—an additional provision that allows
courts to adjust fee awards “upon consideration” of “other equitable
factors deemed relevant.”112 The court held that HB 145 did not modify
subsection (b)(3)(I) at all, which allows courts to vary a fee award based
on “the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the nonprevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the
voluntary use of the courts.”113 Furthermore, Nunapitchuk held that trial
courts applying Rule 82(b)(3)(I) are able to consider the nature of the
claim, the absence of economic incentives to bring the claim, and any
other relevant factors that bear on the deterrence inquiry.114
Emphasizing that HB 145 was to have no effect on Rule 82(b)(3)(I), 115 the
court held that:
[A]lthough HB 145 abrogates, in part, the public interest
litigant exception, litigants advancing public interest claims
may still, on a case-by-case basis, be shielded from awards of
attorney’s fees under Rule 82(b)(3)(I) for much the same reason
that we accepted when we first adopted the exception in its
original protective form: awarding fees in public interest cases
may “deter citizens from litigating questions of general public
concern.”116
Although the court struck down the public interest exception in its
entirety, the way in which it did so showed the real difference that the
court saw between the exception’s protective and affirmative functions.
Because the court had refrained from reaching the constitutional court
access issues in its prior cases,117 there was no clear line where the
112. Id. at 405; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
113. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3)(I). See also Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406
(“[S]ubsection (b)(3)(I) is directly relevant to the issue of the right of access to the
courts. . . . [HB 145] . . . makes no change to subsection (b)(3)(I).”).
114. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406 (“Trial courts remain free to reduce awards
that would otherwise be so onerous to the losing party as to deter similarly
situated litigants—including litigants that would have previously been
identified as public interest litigants—from accessing the courts. In determining
whether an award would deter similarly situated litigants from accessing the
courts, trial courts may continue to consider all relevant factors, including the
nature of the claim advanced and the economic incentives for similarly situated
litigants to bring similar claims.”).
115. See id. at 406 n.84.
116. Id. at 406.
117. See Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973) (“We
do not have to reach the constitutional issue since it is ‘manifestly unreasonable’
to establish a policy under Civil Rule 82 that would enable a store owner to
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constitutionally-required protection of the negative right ended and the
affirmative encouragement of litigation began. Both parts of the
exception had to be considered substantive in nature.118 However, the
court’s treatment of the constitutional challenge demonstrates the true
magnitude of the distinction it saw between the exception’s protective
and affirmative functions. Despite HB 145’s express prohibition against
trial courts varying fees based on the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, the
number of people that would be affected, whether a governmental entity
could be expected to bring or participate in the case, or the extent of the
party’s economic incentives to bring the case,119 the Nunapitchuk court
specifically allowed courts to continue using these factors to prevent
litigants from becoming deterred. The Nunapitchuk court’s holding
reveals its belief that some amount of protection is necessary to prevent
the English Rule from infringing upon the right of access to courts.
Just like the affirmative component of the former public interest
exception, Alaska’s English Rule creates a positive right to court access
by entitling a litigant to recover some of her attorneys’ fees if she wins.120
The right is different from the public interest exception in that it is
available to all prevailing litigants and only provides for partial
compensation,121 but it too creates a cost that must be paid by someone
other than the litigant. The purpose of the protective component of the
public interest exception was to limit that obligation in order to prevent
it from encroaching on other litigants’ negative rights by inappropriately
deterring them from access to the courts. For the court to uphold HB
145, it was imperative it be able to protect this negative right in some
other way.

III. THE STATE OF THE LAW
Except as to constitutional claims,122 the public interest exception is
dead. Although some remnants of the protective component live on in
Rule 82(b)(3)(I), the formalized, predictable test of the former exception
is gone. Although Nunapitchuk reaffirms that trial courts should shield
litigants from attorneys’ fees awards when necessary to prevent

receive such a sizeable allowance for attorney's fees against a party who has
brought suit in good faith.”).
118. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 404–05.
119. HB 145, 2003 Alaska Sess. laws ch. 86 § 2 (codified as amended at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.60.010, 09.68.040 (2014)).
120. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
121. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b).
122. HB 145 § 2(c)–(e) (preserving the public interest exception for
constitutional claims).
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deterrence,123 trial courts are now left to decide whether or not to reduce
attorneys’ fees by way of Rule 82 “on a case-by-case basis.”124 Likewise,
although Nunapitchuk allows courts to consider the same factors used by
the public interest exception when doing this, they are no longer limited
to considering only these factors.125 The fundamental change worked by
HB 145 and Nunapitchuk is that now trial courts are free to assign
whatever weights they wish to whichever factors they prefer; there is no
longer any structure to the inquiry, only an overarching goal.
Litigants must also beware that the analytical approach currently
embraced under Rule 82(b)(3)(I) gives more discretion to trial courts in
determining the extent to which a litigant qualifies for protection. Where
previously, qualifying litigants would be fully shielded from awards of
attorneys’ fees, courts now have discretion to only partly exempt
litigants if they wish. Authority remains to fully shield a litigant from a
fee award, but this is no longer the default.126
In short, trial courts now have broad discretion. After Nunapitchuk,
it is clear that trial courts do have a duty to prevent the deterrence of
future litigants by shielding parties from unduly burdensome awards of
attorneys’ fees. But it is unclear how they will go about doing this—the
dependable mechanisms of the public interest exception are gone. After
HB 145 and Nunapitchuk, litigants are left with little ability to predict the
real risks of litigation.

IV. PREVENTING DETERRENCE
In light of the broad discretion granted to trial courts by HB 145
and the Nunapitchuk opinion, courts must take heed of the responsibility
conferred on them to prevent unconstitutional deterrence of court
access. Although the underlying issue is the citizen’s ability to avail
herself of the courts, deterrence is often more dependent on the
characteristics of the claim itself than on characteristics of the particular
123. See Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406 (“[L]itigants advancing public interest
claims may still . . . be shielded from awards of attorney's fees . . . for much the
same reason that we accepted when we first adopted the exception in its original
protective form: awarding fees in public interest cases may ‘deter citizens from
litigating questions of general public concern.’”).
124. Id.
125. See id. (allowing courts to consider “all relevant factors”).
126. See, e.g., Gold Country Estates Pres. Grp., Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star
Borough, 270 P.3d 787, 799–800 (Alaska 2012) (holding that “it was within the
superior court's power to [fully] deny the [attorneys’] fee award under Civil
Rule 82”). Gold Country emphasized that Nunapitchuk had left the door open for
trial courts to consider all relevant factors in their Rule 82(b)(3)(I) inquiries, and
to reduce awards as needed whenever they determine that the risk of attorneys’
fees awards might chill similar claims in the future. Id. at 800.
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plaintiff. The structure of the former public interest exception captured
this; it gave no regard to the identity of the claimant herself, and focused
instead on particulars of the claim, including the policies it might
advance, how many people would be affected, who else might be able to
bring it, and the potential economic incentives for doing so.127
Characteristics of the claimant mattered inasmuch as they affected the
analysis of these factors. For instance, it would change the deterrence
analysis significantly if a particular plaintiff had significant economic
incentives to bring a claim that formally sought only non-monetary
relief—to that plaintiff and to those similarly situated, the claim would
have economic value. Courts applying Rule 82(b)(3)(I) to prevent
deterrence must ask whether the claim itself—as it will be viewed by
litigants similarly situated to the one at hand—is a claim that is likely to
be deterred. If it is, then courts bear a responsibility to ensure that
plaintiffs do not become unable to reasonably bring such a claim before
the courts.
In particular, courts ought to pay special attention to claims that
lack otherwise compelling financial incentives. There is ample legal
authority for courts to exercise their discretion protectively in these
cases. When claims lacking financial incentives seek to address harms
affecting numerous individuals, courts must be especially wary.
Protection of these types of claims has nothing to do with the policies or
political ideologies they may reflect. Rather, the nature of these claims
renders them especially vulnerable to deterrence because they carry
disproportionate risks relative even to the substantial value they may
hold for plaintiffs. Accordingly, judges must be watchful in these cases
to ensure that the English Rule does not infringe on plaintiffs’ ability to
avail themselves of the courts.
A.

Weighing the Characteristics of the Claim: Poker for Plaintiffs

Adding a potential cost to bringing claims before the courts will
deter financially secure plaintiffs as well as impoverished ones. While
some plaintiffs may simply be unable to afford the ticket price, others
will be similarly deterred when the cost of litigation starts to exceed its
potential value to them. In the first instance, the financial conditions of a
particular plaintiff may render her deterred by the anticipated cost of
litigation, no matter how reasonable that cost may be. In the second case,
the unreasonableness of the cost itself will deter the plaintiff, regardless
of her financial prosperity. There is undoubtedly some overlap in these
127. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 394 (summarizing the exception’s history and
elements).
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two scenarios, but the latter case demonstrates the importance of
developing a doctrine, similar to the public interest exception, that
protects certain kinds of claims and does not focus only on the attributes
of particular plaintiffs.
To see the difference between the two types of deterrence that
courts must prevent vis-à-vis future litigants, imagine how a card shark
plays a hand of poker. Presume that, based on what she knows about
her opponent’s hand, she can determine that there is a thirty-five
percent chance that her hand is the strongest. If her opponent bets
$100,000, there are two independent reasons why this should give our
protagonist pause. The first is that she might have less than that in her
bank; on the chance that she loses, she is going to be bankrupt. This
corresponds to the question of whether or not the cost is reasonable for
her. The second reason she should be deterred is that it is a bad hand.
Experts can quantify this by looking at the “expected value” of the hand.
Supposing there is no other money on the table, the expected value of
her hand is (0.35) × (100,000) – (0.65) × (100,000) = $35,000 – $65,000 =
–$30,000. This is a bad bet to take, because the odds say that if our card
shark played the hand many times, she would average a loss of $30,000:
a net cost. In other words, the hand is a bad investment.
Unlike in poker, the amount a plaintiff stands to win in litigation
under the English Rule is independent of what the plaintiff might lose—
the amount she risks depends on her opponent’s investment in
defending the case. If she stands to win $30,000 but could lose $100,000,
then even with a seventy percent chance of prevailing the investment is
a bad one: the expected value of the “hand” is (0.70) × (30,000) – (0.30) ×
($100,000) = $21,000 – $30,000 = –$9,000.128 Unless the value of the nonmonetary relief the plaintiff seeks is independently worth at least $9,000
to her, the case is not worth taking. In practice, she might win, or she
might lose a lot more, but the odds tell us it would be a terrible hand to
play because the expected result would be a loss. The judgment the
plaintiff seeks may be worth the given price to her, but where the price
is higher than the value of the relief sought, the case becomes an
unreasonably expensive investment to bring before the courts,
regardless of its likely merits.
Under the American Rule, plaintiffs must ask if addressing a
particular harm is worth the cost of their attorney. When the damages

128. For an example of the analogous calculations under the American Rule,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, 764–65 (8th ed. 2011)
(“Under the American rule, . . . the plaintiff’s net expected gain from litigating is
the judgment if he wins discounted by his estimate of the probability that he will
win, minus his litigation costs.”).
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sought are non-economic, plaintiffs are essentially asked to value their
claim directly: “Is getting this injunction worth the $10,000 I would have
to pay my lawyer?” Under the English Rule, plaintiffs are compensated
for a part of this cost if they win, but may have substantially increased
liability if they lose, especially if the defendant has reason to spend a lot.
The total expected cost of the case is the expected cost of the plaintiff’s
attorneys’ fees plus whatever the plaintiff should expect to pay of the
defendants’ fees. The cost of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees might be
viewed as a market constraint operating to ensure a reasonably efficient
allocation of attorneys’ time. On top of these fees, however, the English
Rule itself can contribute a substantial expected cost to court access.
Alaska courts must be vigilant when awarding attorneys’ fees so that
they are not responsible for turning otherwise reasonable future claims
into bad investments—this would be the very definition of deterrence.
Beyond fairness to the plaintiff at hand, the fundamental question
is how rational, future plaintiffs will weigh their claims. Obviously,
many of these values—the exact chance of winning, the potential cost—
are unpredictable and incalculable in practice; no one needs to crunch
actual numbers when awarding attorneys’ fees. But judges must be
cognizant of the way their habits in awarding attorneys’ fees will affect
the implicit balancing undertaken by prospective plaintiffs in the future.
A pattern of awarding fees in a particular type of case will lead plaintiffs
to expect that a similar cost may await them, and shielding individual
plaintiffs because they lack the means to pay a more severe award offers
no suggestion of protection in the general sense. Will the expected cost
make plaintiffs think twice about bringing their claim in the first place?
When a suit lacks economic incentives, and especially when it is also one
that affects a large number of people, this becomes a very real
possibility. Courts can only prevent this by routinely protecting these
types of claims, so that future plaintiffs will not come to expect such
claims to cost more than they are worth.129
B.

Lack of Economic Incentives

The supreme court acknowledged the importance of economic
incentives in one of its earliest public interest exception cases, Mobil Oil

129. Other writers have used similar expected value calculations to predict
the effects of different fee shifting systems. See Ronald Braeutigam et al., An
Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
173, 176–77 (Winter 1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
55, 56–58 (1982).

SOMMERS_V13 - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

154

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/3/2014 1:38 PM

VOL. 31:1

Corp v. Local Boundary Commission,130 and thereafter adopted it into the
formal test for “public interest” litigants in Kenai Lumber Co. v.
LeResche.131 In Nunapitchuk, the court specifically recognized the
importance that should be given to economic incentives and expressly
permitted courts to continue considering this factor.132 Lack of economic
incentives means that plaintiffs will have a hard time justifying the risks
imposed by the English Rule and renders these claims especially
susceptible to being deterred.
If a suit is for non-monetary damages, or if the monetary damages
are small relative to the complexity of the case, the plaintiff is not able to
pay her attorney through a contingency fee agreement. This usually
means that the plaintiff must pay out-of-pocket.133 Assuming the
plaintiff will not derive some other economic benefit from prevailing in
the case, the claim is already vulnerable to deterrence by its cost alone.
On top of this, however, comes the English Rule, which imposes a risk
that the plaintiff will end up liable for a part of her opponent’s fees as
well. If it appears that these fees could be significant,134 then this risk can
quickly become prohibitively significant. Litigation is often
unpredictable because the plaintiff has no control over the fees that will
be accumulated by the opposing party, and the trial court has broad
discretion with respect to how it will award fees at the end of the day. If
the suit has economic value, that might outweigh this potential cost; but
where the suit lacks economic incentive, this risk essentially becomes the
expected price of the relief sought by the plaintiff. As the risk grows,
plaintiffs may quickly find that even the most significant of claims
become unreasonable investments to bring before the courts.
Trial courts should consider the risk-reward calculation that future
litigants will implicitly undertake when deciding whether or not to
bring a case. Other factors may also affect deterrence,135 but in cases
where economic incentives are scant or lacking, courts should shield
litigants from attorneys’ fees awards in order to prevent the potential

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

518 P.2d 92, 104 (Alaska 1974).
646 P.2d 215, 223 (Alaska 1982).
State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 406 (Alaska 2007).
Alternatively, the attorney might take the case pro bono.
See, e.g., Lisa Demer, Pebble Foes Face Paying $1 Million in Legal Fees,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.adn.com/2013/
10/15/3126803/the-fight-over-whether-pebble.html. The state sought $483,579
in legal fees plus reimbursement of $66,485 in costs from the plaintiffs, and
Pebble Mine sought an additional $283,543 plus costs of $104,454 as legal
expenses it incurred as an intervener. Id.
135. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406 (allowing consideration of the “nature of
the claim” and all other relevant factors, in addition to the claim’s economic
incentives).
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costs from deterring meritorious claims by future litigants.
C.

The Number of People Affected by the Alleged Harm

The number of people affected by a claim compounds the problems
presented when a claim is for non-economic damages. Like the absence
of economic incentives, the number of people affected by a claim was
also one of the original factors evaluated by the public interest
exception.136 Nunapitchuk similarly permits trial courts to continue to
consider this factor when varying awards of attorneys’ fees under Rule
82.137
The number of people potentially affected by litigation is also the
number of people actually affected by whatever alleged harm the claim
seeks to address. When this number is large, organizing all of the
affected individuals can present insuperable costs, and, as a result, these
cases are frequently brought by a small group of the potential plaintiffs
or by a non-profit organization.138 The benefit to these small subsets of
the possible plaintiffs will only be a fraction of the total benefit. When
deciding whether or not to bring such a claim, these litigants have only
their small slice of the pie to weigh against the case’s potential cost to
them.139 These plaintiffs still have to pay the full cost of litigating the
case, making these cases incommensurately expensive from the start.
Awarding attorneys’ fees under Alaska’s English Rule exacerbates the
problem, because these plaintiffs will also find themselves liable for the
full risks of the litigation.
This leaves the plaintiffs’ risk-reward analysis severely skewed.
Because these claims carry such a disproportionately large financial risk
for the plaintiffs that typically bring them, trial courts should be
136. Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 991 (Alaska 1977).
137. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406.
138. Additionally, because the harm applies to so many, potential plaintiffs
may hold out from joining the suit in the hope that others will carry the risk in
their place. Cf. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 276
(1998) (discussing the general problem of “free-riders” who hold out from
litigation affecting many people in the hope that someone else will pursue the
claim and bear the costs of litigation in their stead).
139. In short, where many people are affected, a collective action problem
frequently arises where the seemingly optimal short-term action for individuals
(e.g., waiting for someone else to sue) undermines long-term wellbeing for the
group (e.g., no one ends up suing) and is hindered in its resolution by the
transaction costs involved in effectively organizing all of the affected parties. See
generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action
Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 74 (2007) (defining and
discussing collective action problems); DWYER, supra note 138, at 276 (discussing
various problems created by positive transaction costs when a harm affects
many people).
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especially cognizant of how little countervailing incentive may exist to
balance the risk of a fee award. When the potential cost significantly
outweighs the potential benefit to plaintiffs, future plaintiffs will be
deterred from availing themselves of the courts to redress these types of
harms.

CONCLUSION
More data is needed to conclusively determine how HB 145 and
Nunapitchuk have affected plaintiffs in Alaska, but anecdotal reports give
reason to be worried. The Sierra Club, which in the past has filed
numerous cases to protect Alaska’s natural resources, “has not brought a
single action in Alaska state court since the Nunapitchuk decision
because there has been no reliable way to predict its potential liability
for fee and cost awards.”140 Likewise, the Northern Alaska
Environmental Center “has filed only one non-constitutional case” since
the Nunapitchuk decision, “which had eight plaintiff organizations to
share the burden of any potential adverse fee award.”141 The risks for
potential plaintiff groups in other contexts are similar.
The unpredictable standard enunciated in Nunapitchuk undermines
the supreme court’s concern that future litigants not be deterred by
onerous awards of attorneys’ fees. Even where courts follow fairly
regular practices, their decisions will be made on a fact-intensive, caseby-case basis. Litigants may take some solace from seeing awards
reduced against similarly situated plaintiffs; however, they will never be
able to rely on a similar reduction happening in their own case until
doctrine evolves that regularly protects certain types of claims,
independent of the plaintiff’s identity. The current standard is simply
too open-ended, and the uncertainty this creates for litigants may be
chilling in its own right.
* * *
Uncertainty is a recurrent problem for Alaska’s English Rule. The
supreme court’s unwillingness to reach the constitutional issues
underlying the public interest exception provides an illustrative
example. Because the law was unsettled, neither party to the
Nunapitchuk litigation knew whether the constitutional claim would
succeed. Indeed, few observers could likely have predicted the nuances
of the court’s eventual holding. This is not to say that the court’s exercise

140. Brief for Council on Foundations et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners and Applicants at 4–5, Nos. S-15059, S-15060, S-15089, 2013 WL
5297623 (Alaska 2013).
141. Id.
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of restraint was wrong. Rather, it serves to highlight that the law is often
unclear.
Reversals by appellate courts occur with regularity, and issues of
first impression are by no means uncommon, especially in a court
system as young as Alaska’s. This is an essential part of the common law
system that we practice in, but Alaska’s English Rule takes no account of
this. If lawyers could predict with certainty how litigation would resolve
itself, there would be little need for judges. All cases would settle
because parties would know their chance of success and settle for the
expected value of any payout. The problem is that legal claims are often
uncertain, and the number of civil cases that make it to trial and that get
appealed demonstrates the important role the adversarial system plays
in resolving factual and legal uncertainties.
The English Rule offers prevailing parties a potentially unbounded
positive right to a percentage of their lawyers’ fees by considering fees
to be part of a complete recovery.142 This right comes into tension with
the protection of a litigant’s negative right to argue her case in court.143
Both plaintiffs and defendants are affected adversely, as plaintiffs may
refrain from bringing meritorious cases before the courts, because they
perceive too much financial risk in a loss, and defendants may feel
compelled to settle despite meritorious defenses, because they too bear
an increased financial risk should they lose.144 When the parties’ lawyers
can predict with some accuracy the expected results of the litigation,
these problems recede because the risk to the meritorious party is
diminished, and allocation of costs to a wrongful party is less troubling.
But, in cases where the law is unsettled, parties may have no way of
142. The right is unbounded in the sense that the amount of fees potentially
recoverable depends only on how much the party spends. The recovery may
only be a percentage of the total amount, but it still grows linearly with how
much the party spends. Cf. Bozarth v. Atl. Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 6 (Alaska
1992) (Matthews, J., dissenting) (“If a $10,500 attorney's fee award is so great as
to ‘foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard’ it has that effect
independent of whether it represents the prevailing party's full, or merely
partial, fees.”).
143. Cf. Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973) (“For
where in order to seek judicial remedies, a plaintiff must risk liability for the full
amount of attorney's fees the other side sees fit to incur, it takes little
imagination to foresee that the size of a party's bank account will have a major
impact on his access to the courts.”).
144. Cf. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorney Fees in a Loser Pays System 23
(Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 13-95, Oct. 6, 2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336669
(finding favorable treatment of individual plaintiffs who prevailed against
corporations relative to individual plaintiffs who prevailed against other
individuals in Israel, which uses a predominantly loser pays system while
granting trial judges full discretion to award attorneys’ fees as they see fit).
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accurately assessing the true strength of their claims, allowing the
financial risk created by the English Rule to become determinative.145
To make matters worse, litigants have no way to predict how much
their opponent may spend in litigation or how the trial judge is likely to
exercise her discretion at the end of the proceedings. This makes the
magnitude of the risk uncertain, as well. This can be a chilling
combination. When the probability of success on a claim approaches
zero percent or one hundred percent its expected value becomes clear:
the value will quickly approximate either the rewards of winning or the
cost of losing. However, when the probability wanders between these
extremes, nearing fifty percent, the potential cost of the other party’s
fees can become the determinative factor in the decision whether or not
to bring the claim. If the potential cost of paying for part of the
defendant’s fees becomes too large, it can quickly overwhelm the other
terms in the calculation and become the decisive factor in whether or not
to bring the claim.
If parties refrain from litigating these cases, precisely because of the
uncertainty they entail, then how is the law ever to clarify itself?
Without opportunities for courts to resolve these claims, how is the law
to evolve? Moreover, how will the parties themselves resolve these
disputes? Perhaps a third factor courts should consider when assessing
attorneys’ fees is the legal uncertainty surrounding the claim. The
federal system provides a model for this in one of its major fee shifting
statutes, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),146 which provides that
parties prevailing in actions against the United States are entitled to
attorneys’ fees, “unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.”147 Importantly, this standard requires significantly more
than merely being “undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness.”148
Rather, the EAJA test requires the Government’s position to have been
reasonable in light of the law and facts pertaining to the case.149 The

145. Cf. Shavell, supra note 129, at 59–60. Shavell conducts similar expected
value calculations to those undertaken here, and finds that, in general, as the
certainty of prevailing on a claim diminishes, plaintiffs become less likely to
bring the claim under the English Rule than under the American Rule because of
the attendant risks; specifically, there is a critical point, in terms of the claim’s
certainty, below which the English Rule starts to deter litigants. Id.
146. The Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012 & Supp. V 2011)).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
148. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988).
149. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1434, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003,
5011 (stating that the EAJA test “is essentially one of reasonableness in law and
fact”). See also Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563–68; COHEN, supra note 71, at 10.
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problem with the EAJA standard is that it is still vague and creates its
own uncertainties.
Nonetheless, Alaska might do well to consider adoption of a
similar premise as it continues to tune its English Rule. Litigation is an
expensive process, and when its costs can be meaningfully attributed to
a party’s wrongfulness, it may make sense to have that party bear the
burden of its actions. But when the real source of the problem is the
law’s imprecision, litigation costs may just be the price we pay for the
flexibility of a common law system.150 No one party should bear these
costs alone.
First, however, Alaska courts must focus on the uncertainties
unleashed by HB 145 and Nunapitchuk. Until plaintiffs can predict with
some certainty what the potential costs of litigation will be, and until
those costs are reasonable in light of the claim being brought, Alaska
courts will be unable to fulfill their constitutional purpose as a forum for
all people.151

150. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123–32 (1965) (discussing the
important flexibility afforded by the “open texture” of law and the centrality of
this feature to our legal system).
151. Cf. Bozarth v. Atl. Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 6 (Alaska 1992)
(Matthews, J., dissenting) (“If the superior court is to serve its constitutional
purpose as a forum available to all the people, superior court judges must
consider whether an award of attorney's fees will impair the constitutional right
of access to the courts.”); accord Rhodes v. Erion, 189 P.3d 1051, 1054–55 (Alaska
2008) (remarking Justice Matthews’s concern about court access, expressed in his
Bozarth dissent, “played a role in the addition of Rule 82(b)(3)(I) in 1993”).

